Buffalo Law Review
Volume 40

Number 1

Article 8

1-1-1992

The Right to Refuse Antipsychotic Drug Treatment and the
Supreme Court: Washington v. Harper
Jeannette Brian
University at Buffalo School of Law (Student)

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview
Part of the Food and Drug Law Commons, and the Health Law and Policy Commons

Recommended Citation
Jeannette Brian, The Right to Refuse Antipsychotic Drug Treatment and the Supreme Court: Washington
v. Harper, 40 Buff. L. Rev. 251 (1992).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview/vol40/iss1/8

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ University at
Buffalo School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Buffalo Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital
Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. For more information, please contact lawscholar@buffalo.edu.

The Right to Refuse Antipsychotic Drug
Treatment and the Supreme Court:
Washington v. Harper
JEANNETTE BRIAN*

The makers of our Constitution... conferred, as against the Government,
the right to be let alone - the most comprehensive of rights and the right

most valued by civilized men.
Justice Brandeis'

I.

INTRODUCTION

On February 27, 1990, the United States Supreme Court granted
patients in state mental institutions the constitutional right to refuse
treatment with antipsychotic drugs.' That right, announced by the
Court in Washington v. Harper,3 was grounded in the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and accorded patients a constitutionally protected liberty interest in avoiding unwanted antipsychotic

medication.
The announcement of the Court's decision appeared to be good

news for the more than 343,000 individuals admitted to the inpatient
services of state-operated psychiatric hospitals nationwide. Their right
to refuse treatment with antipsychotic drugs was extensively litigated in
*

J.D. Candidate, SUNY at Buffalo Law School, May 1992.
1. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
2. The terms "antipsychotic," "psychotropic," and "neuroleptic" are used interchangeably to
refer to medication used to treat thought disorders such as schizophrenia. Amicus CuriaeBrief of
the American Psychological Association in Support of Respondent at 2-3 n.1, Washington v.
Harper, 110 S. Ct. 1028 (1990) (No. 88-599) [hereinafter Brief of the American Psychological Ass'n].
The major antipsychotic drugs include Haldol, Mellaril, Navane, Compazine, Prolixin, and
Thorazine. Brief for the American Psychiatric Association and the Washington State Psychiatric
Association as Amici Curiaeat 6 n.l, Washington v. Harper, 110 S. Ct. 1028 (1990) (No. 88-599)
[hereinafter Brief of the American Psychiatric Ass'n].
3. Washington v. Harper, 110 S. Ct. 1028 (1990).
4. In 1983, an estimated 343,774 individuals were admitted to state and county psychiatric hospitals nationwide, as reported in the Amicus Curiae Brief of the New Jersey Department of the
Public Advocate at 12 n.6, Harper(No. 88-599) (citing a National Institute of Mental Health study,
titled State and County Mental Hospitals, United States, 1982-83 and 1983-84, National Institute of
Mental Health, DHHS Publication No. (ADM 86-1478) at 3 (1986)).
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the lower federal courts,' as well as in numerous state courts,6 in the
decade preceding the Supreme Court's Harperdecision. With Harper,it
appeared that the highest court in the land gave institutionalized mental

patients a constitutional right to resist forcible injections 7 of powerful
mind-altering drugs. This right is vitally important to such patients, be-

cause antipsychotic drugs have serious, debilitating and sometimes irreversible side effects.'

However, the Supreme Court's Harper decision,

5. See, e.g., United States v. Watson, 893 F.2d 970 (8th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 3243
(1990); Chambers v. Ingram, 858 F.2d 351 (7th Cir. 1988); Walters v. Western State Hospital, 864
F.2d 695 (10th Cir. 1988); Dautremont v. Broadlawns Hospital, 827 F.2d 291 (8th Cir. 1987);
United States v. Charters, 829 F.2d 479 (4th Cir. 1987), 863 F.2d 302 (4th Cir. 1988) (en bane), cert.
denied, 110 S. Ct. 1317 (1990); Bee v. Greaves, 744 F.2d 1387 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
1214 (1985); Johnson v. Silvers, 742 F.2d 823 (4th Cir. 1984); Stensvad v. Reivitz, 601 F. Supp. 128
(W.D. Wis. 1985); R.A.J. v. Miller, 590 F. Supp. 1319 (N.D. Tex. 1984); Osgood v. District of
Columbia, 567 F. Supp. 1026 (D.D.C. 1983); United States v. Leatherman, 580 F. Supp. 977
(D.D.C. 1983); Project Release v. Prevost, 551 F. Supp. 1298 (E.D.N.Y. 1982), aff'd, 722 F.2d 960
(2d Cir. 1983); Davis v. Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. 915 (N.D. Ohio 1980); Rogers v. Okn, 478 F. Supp.
1342 (D. Mass. 1979), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 634 F.2d 650 (1st Cir. 1980), vacated and remanded sub nom., Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982); Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131 (D.N.J.
1978), 476 F. Supp. 1294 (D.N.J. 1079), aff'd, 653 F.2d 836 (3d Cir. 1981), vacated, 458 U.S. 1119
(1982), on remand, 720 F.2d 266 (3d Cir. 1983).
6. See, eg., In re Mental Commitment of M.P., 510 N.E.2d 645 (Ind. 1987); Riese v. St. Mary's
Hospital & Medical Center, 243 Cal. Rptr. 241 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987); Large v. Superior Court, 714
P.2d 399 (Ariz. 1986) (en bane); Rivers v. Katz, 495 N.E.2d 337 (N.Y. 1986); People v. Medina, 705
P.2d 961 (Colo. 1985) (en banc); Rogers v. Commissioner of Dep't of Mental Health, 458 N.E.2d
308 (Mass. 1983); Anderson v. Arizona, 663 P.2d 570 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982); In re Guardianship of
Roe, 421 N.E.2d 40 (Mass. 1981); In re Mental Health of K.K.B., 609 P.2d 747 (Okla. 1980);
Goedecke v. State Dep't of Inst., 603 P.2d 123 (Colo. 1979) (en bane).
7. "Involuntary medication [with antipsychotic drugs] is usually accomplished by restraining
the inmate while he is given an intra-muscular or subcutaneous injection with a hypodermic needle."
Brief of the American Psychological Ass'n, supra note 2, at 3.
8. The benefits of antipsychotic drugs to acutely mentally ill patients are well documented. See
THE PHARMACOLOGICAL BASIS OF THERAPEUTICS 395-400, 414-18 (Alfred G. Gilman et al. eds.,
6th ed. 1980). However, the adverse side effects which commonly accompany these medications are
equally well documented. See, eg., Dilip V. Jeste et al., The Biology and ExperimentalTreatment of
TardiveDyskinesia and OtherRelated Movement Disorders,in 8 AMERICAN HANDBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY 536, 537-39 (2d ed. 1986); AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N TASK FORCE ON LATE NEUROLOGICAL EFFECTS OF ANTIPSYCHOTIC DRUGS, REPORT 18: TARDIVE DYSKINESIA (1980); Ross J.
Baldessarini, Clinicaland EpidemiologicAspects of Tardive Dyskinesia, 46:4 J. CLIN. PSYCHIATRY 8
(1985); Gerard A. Addonizio et al., Neuroleptic Malignant Syndrome" Review and Analysis of 115
Cases, 22 BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 1004 (1987).
Although there is sharp disagreement in the medical and mental health establishments about the
severity, duration, and frequency of adverse side effects caused by antipsychotic drugs, there is universal agreement that these drugs can cause debilitating side effects, some of which appear to be
irreversible and can even be fatal. The most disabling of these side effects are akathisia (repetitive,
irresistible tapping-type movements), dystonia (severe rigidity or spasms of the upper body, writhing
and grimacing), and neuroleptic malignant syndrome, a potentially fatal condition. Brief of the
American Psychological Ass'n, supra note 2, at 2.
The most widely discussed and studied side effect is tardive dyskinesia, a condition characterized
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far from giving patients legal protection, actually exposed them to forcible medication with little or no prospect of federal constitutional relief.
Although the Court gave patients the right to refuse antipsychotic drug
treatment, it emasculated that right by allowing hospital staff to override
nonconsenting patients, without a judicial hearing or review by an independent medical panel outside the hospital, leaving patients with only
the flimsiest of due process safeguards. Harper gave psychiatrists and

state mental hospital personnel virtually unfettered discretion in medicating patients against their will.
This Note will examine the potential ramifications of the Court's
decision in Washington v. Harper.' Part I reviews the facts and the
Court's reasoning. Part II traces the development of forcible medication
law as it evolved in the lower federal courts during the decade preceding

Harper. In particular, it explores the three major legal issues which the
lower federal courts grappled with during this period of intense right-torefuse litigation: first, whether patients who have been involuntarily committed to state mental institutions have a presumption of legal compe-

tence to make medical decisions for themselves and, thus, have the right
to refuse unwanted treatment; secondly, whether the Supreme Court's
by bizarre, uncontrollable movements of the face (lip smacking, chewing, protruding tongue, grimacing), and similar rhythmic involuntary movements of the trunk, arms, and legs. Brief of the American Psychological Ass'n, supra note 2, at 7 (citing Jeste et al., supra at 537-38).
Tardive dyskinesia is particularly disturbing since it appears to be quite prevalent. See Daniel E.
Casey & Jes Gerlach, Tardive Dyskinesia: Management and New Treatment, in GUIDELINES FOR
THE USE OF PSYCHOTROPIC DRUGS:

A

CLINICAL HANDBOOK

187 (Harvey C. Stancer et al. eds.,

1984) (reporting "the occurrence of TD in 20% to 40% of patients maintained on chronic neuroleptic treatment"); ALAN F. SCHATZBERG & JONATHON 0. COLE, MANUAL OF CLINICAL
PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 101 (1986) (reporting rates of TD of 50-60% in chronically institutionalized patients). See also Rennie v. Klein, 476 F. Supp. 1294, 1300 (D.N.J. 1979) (the court cited
estimates by the medical director of a New Jersey mental facility that 35% to 50% of the hospital's
patients had tardive dyskinesia).
Tardive dyskinesia is also irreversible in some two-thirds of those patients with the disease, even if
treatment is discontinued at onset. See Brief of the American Psychological Ass'n, supra note 2, at 9
n.18 ("We estimate that in approximately one-third of these patients in whom neuroleptics are
stopped, TD will disappear. The remaining two-thirds of these patients will have persistent TD....
To date, there is no proven specific curative treatment for persistent TD." (quoting Jeste et al., supra
at 560)).
9. This Note analyzes the Supreme Court's Harperdecision from a mental health law perspective; however, Harper also has ramifications as a prisoner rights case. For an analysis of Harper
from the latter viewpoint, see Laura Ryan, Note, Washington State Prison Procedurefor the Forcible
Administration of Antipsychotic Medication to Prison Inmates Does Not Violate Due Process:Washington v. Harper, 59 U. CIN. L. REv. 1373 (1991); Project, Nineteenth Annual Review of Criminal
Procedure: UnitedStates Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals 1988-1989, 78 GEO. L.J. 699, 1429,
1446 n.3503, 1449 nn.3514-15, 1451 n.3518 (1990).
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decision in an important 1982 case, Youngberg v. Romeo, 10 mandates
that courts defer to the professional judgments of psychiatrists in treating
nonconsenting patients with antipsychotic drugs; and, finally, what due
process is required if patients do have the right to refuse unwanted treatment with antipsychotic drugs. Parts III, IV and V analyze the probable
impact of Harper in relation to the aforementioned issues, and Part VI
evaluates how narrow or wide the holding in Harper is likely to be
construed.
I.
A.

ANALYSIS OF WASHINGTON

. HARPER

Facts of the Case

Walter Harper was an inmate in a mental health unit of a Washington State prison. While there, he was injected with antipsychotic drugs
against his will.11 These forcible injections occurred despite the fact that
Harper had never been adjudged legally "incompetent" in a court proceeding, and disregarding the fact that he repeatedly expressed his objections to the injections to the prison hospital staff. 2
Before subjecting Harper to the injections, the prison hospital held a
hearing pursuant to prison policy. 3 This policy stipulated that a prisoner had to be afforded the opportunity of a pre-injection hearing in front
of a hospital committee consisting of a staff psychiatrist, psychologist,
and associate superintendent of the hospital center.
The prisoner was to be given twenty-four hours notice of the hearing. He was permitted to be present at the hearing and was entitled to
introduce evidence and cross-examine witnesses. Although he could not
be represented by an attorney, he could be assisted by a lay advisor appointed to him. 4 The prisoner could appeal the panel's decision to the
superintendent of the hospital; however, he could obtain judicial review
10. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
11. Harper voluntarily took antipsychotic drugs on and off for six years before involuntary
treatment began in 1982, by which time he had already exhibited two side effects of antipsychotic
drug treatment: dystonia (acute muscle rigidity or spasms of upper body, writhing and grimacing)
and akathisia (repetitive, tapping-type movements). Washington v. Harper, 110 S. Ct. 1028, 104647 n.8.
12. At the hospital hearing held prior to the involuntary injections, Harper testified: "Haldol
paral[y]zed my right side of my body.., you are burning me out of my life... you are burning me
out of my freedom." Harper, 110 S. Ct. at 1046 n.4.
13. Special Offender Center (SOC) Policy 600.30, Harper, 110 S. Ct. at 1033.
14. According to the Harper Court:
The prisoner is introduced to, and may consult with, his appointed advisor at the commencement of the hearing. Harper's advisor ... [was] a nurse practitioner from Washington State Reformatory [who] asked Harper three questions in the hearing.... The
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only by means of a personal restraint petition or extraordinary writ. The
prison policy further stipulated that the committee could override the
prisoner's refusal only if he suffered from a "mental disorder" and was
"gravely disabled," or if he posed a "likelihood of serious harm" to himself, to others, or to property."5
Harper appeared before the committee which, because it found that
he was a danger to others,16 approved the involuntary administration of
antipsychotic drugs. Thereafter, subject to periodic r~view, 7 and over
his continuing objections, Harper was injected with antipsychotic drugs
for almost four years. In 1985, he filed suit in state court claiming that
the state's failure to provide him with a judicial hearing before forcibly
injecting him with antipsychotic drugs violated his due process liberty
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.1
other five advisors appointed for Harper never spoke in the hearings. All five were apparently staff at the SOC....
Harper, 110 S. Ct. at 1055 n.30.
15. Id. at 1033.
16. The dissent in Harpercontinually expressed skepticism at the prison staff's characterization
of Harper as dangerous. The dissent quoted from a report of a non-prison psychiatrist who treated
Harper when he was transferred from the Special Offender Center to another facility. The report
stated:
To this date, he has not exhibited behavior in the presence of any committee members or
custody staff that would qualify him under involuntary medication policy. He does have
a long history of recurrent difficulty and as best as we can tell SOC instituted the involuntary policy and continued it on the basis of past bad faith.
Harper, 110 S. Ct. at 1054 n.27.
The report further stated that "the inmate[']s behavior during the committee hearing did not
meet the criteria for gravely disabled or self injurious behavior. Involuntary mcdication is continued
on the basis of potential violent behavior towards others which has been well documented in the
inmate's history." Id.
At least some of Harper's assaultive behavior was apparently attributable to his frustration at
being medicated against his will. One of Harper's therapist's reported that Harper indicated "he
[was] going to destroy unit property until the medications [were] stopped. He... recently destroyed
the inmates['] stereo as an example of this." Id. at 1051 n.18. Harper's irritable behavior may
actually have been made worse by the involuntary medications. His therapist reported, "[t]hough
Mr. Harper is focused on psychosomatic problems from neuroleptic medications as per the side
effects, the real problem may be that the psychosis is exacerbated by neuroleptic medications." Id. at
n.16.
17. SOC Policy 600.30 required that a three-person committee, composed of hospital staff, review an inmate's case after the first seven days of treatment (later amended to fourteen days). Subsequently, the treating psychiatrist was required to prepare biweekly reports to the Medical Director
for up to six months; a new hearing was then required to assess the need for continued treatment.
Harper, 110 S. Ct. at 1034 n.4.
18. See Harper v. State, 759 P.2d 358, 360-61 n.1 (Wash. Sup. Ct. 1988). At the trial court
level, Harper alleged that the state's involuntary medication policy violated the Equal Protection and
Free Speech clauses of the Constitution, as well as state tort law. The trial court dismissed Harper's
complaint.
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On appeal, the Washington State Supreme Court agreed with
Harper, 9 holding that forcible medication of a legally competent, nonconsenting prisoner without a judicial hearing violated due process.2 0 In
addition, the court concluded that the "highly intrusive nature"2 1 of
treatment with antipsychotic drugs warranted greater procedural safeguards than were provided by the state's internal review by hospital staff.
Only a judicial hearing, where the inmate had the full panoply of adversarial procedures and was represented by counsel, could adequately protect the substantial liberty interests at stake.2 2 The court also noted that
a prisoner had to be given reasonable notice and time to prepare for the
hearing.

23

The Washington court further held that, under the Due Process
Clause, the state could override a patient's refusal only if, at the judicial
hearing, it proved by "clear, cogent, and convincing" evidence that the
administration of antipsychotic medication was both necessary and effective for furthering a compelling state interest.24 In the event that the
prisoner was found to be unable to understand the nature of the proceeding, or that he was incompetent to make a medical decision for himself,
the judge would make a "substituted judgment" for the patient.25
B. Summary of the Majority Opinion
The United States Supreme Court reversed the Washington State
Supreme Court,26 holding that, although Harper did have a constitutionally protected liberty interest in avoiding unwanted medication with antipsychotic drugs, his interest was adequately protected by the state's
nonjudicial hearing. Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, addressed both the substantive and procedural issues raised by the parties
in this case.
Beginning with the substantive issues, the majority asserted that
Harper "possesse[d] a significant liberty interest in avoiding the unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs under the Due Process
19. Id. at 360-62.
20. For a thorough analysis of the Washington State Supreme Court's decision in Harper, see
Amanda E. Lee, Note, Protectingthe Inmate's Right to Refuse Anti-PsychoticDrugs:Harper v. State,
64 WASH. L. REV. 459 (1989).
21. Harper v. State, 759 P.2d at 361-62.
22. Id. at 363-64.
23. Id. at 365.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 364.
26. Washington v. Harper, 110 S. Ct. 1028 (1990).
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Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."'27 Certain requirements had to
be met before the state could override the patient's right to avoid antipsychotic drug treatment. The state had to find that the prisoner had a
serious mental illness, that he was dangerous to himself or others, and
that the treatment was in his medical interest. 28 Once these three preconditions were met - a finding of serious mental illness, dangerousness,
and medical need - the prisoner could be medicated with antipsychotic
drugs against his will. The Court held that the state's policy met the
three requirements, and hence, passed constitutional muster.2 9
The Court next considered what procedural protections were necessary to ensure that the decision to medicate against the prisoner's objections was made fairly and accurately. The primary point of disagreement
between Harper and the State was whether due process required a judicial hearing.3" Thus, the crux of the procedural due process issue was who should decide: a court, as Harper urged, or hospital staff, as the
State argued.
The majority opted for a nonjudicial decisionmaker, stating that an
inmate's interests were adequately protected, and perhaps better served,
by allowing the decision to medicate to be made by medical professionals
rather than a judge.3 1 The following rationale served to explain the
Court's preference for medical, rather than judicial, decisionmakers:
Although we acknowledge the fallibility of medical and psychiatric diagnosis... we do not accept the notion that the shortcomings of specialists
can always be avoided by shifting the decision from a trained specialist using the traditional tools of medical science to an untrained judge or administrative hearing officer after a judicial-type hearing....
*.. The risks associated with antipsychotic drugs3 2are for the most part
medical ones, best assessed by medical professionals.
Anticipating the Court's hostility to a judicial hearing, various amici
briefs proposed an alternative process, positing that if due process did not
require a judicial hearing, it certainly required review by an independent
medical decisionmaker. 3 ' For example, a decision could be rendered by
27. Id. at 1036.
28. Id. at 1039-40.

29. Id. at 1040.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 1042.
32. Id. (quoting Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 607-09 (1979)).
33. Harper argued that the internal panel lacked the necessary independence to render an impartial decision, and that such internal decisionmaking in other cases failed to stop the improper use
of antipsychotic drugs to control or discipline mentally ill patients. Brief of Respondent at 28,
Harper(No. 88-599). The Brief also noted that improper diagnosis of schizophrenia may be as high
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a psychiatrist from outside the institution or by a panel of outside medical and mental health experts.34 The Court rejected this alternative approach, stating that independence of the decisionmaker was satisfactorily
achieved by the prison's committee of internal staff decisionmakers, and
observing there was "no indication institutional biases affected or altered
the decision to medicate respondent against his will." 3 5
as 40%, a statistic which further supports the contention that antipsychotic drugs are inappropriately prescribed in many cases and that internal decisionmaking has not served as a check on misdiagnosis and mistreatment. Id. at 16 (citing Donald J. Kemna, Current Status ofInstitutionalized
Mental Health Patients' Right to Refuse Psychotropic Drugs, 6 J. LEGAL MED. 107, 115 (1985)).
The American Psychological Association, in its amicus brief, argued that some psychiatrists, as a
rule, show a "persistent bias in favor of drugs," and that this bias was demonstrated in Harper's
treatment record: "The State and its amici reflect this bias by referring repeatedly to the existence of
two options: drug therapy or no therapy." Brief of the American Psychological Ass'n, supra note 2,
at 27.
Legal commentators also have noted the reliance on antipsychotic medications by the psychiatric
profession, to the virtual exclusion of all other alternative therapeutic measures. See Vicki Anderson, Comment, Right to Refuse Antipsychotic Medication: A Proposal for Legislative Consideration,
17 IND. L. REV. 1035, 1038-41 (1984); Thomas A. Bickers, Comment, Psychiatry With a Conscience:
A Survey of the Right to Control Psychotropic Medication and the Involuntarily Committed Mental
Patient, 54 TENN. L. REv. 85, 86-90 (1986); Robert Plotkin, Limiting the Therapeutic Orgy: Mental
Patients' Right to Refuse Treatment, 72 Nw. U. L. REv. 461, 474-78 (1978). For the psychiatric
point of view in rebuttal, see generally 137 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 327-58 (1980) (articles by psychiatrists about patients' right to refuse medication).
Judges, too, have given credence to plaintiffs' allegations that these medications are used by understaffed, underfunded mental institutions as an easy, inexpensive means of controlling incarcerated
populations. For case law documentation of indiscriminate forcible medication practices in state
mental hospitals, see Rennie v. Klein, 476 F. Supp. 1294, 1299-1303 (D.N.J. 1979) and Davis v.
Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. 915, 926-27 (N.D. Ohio 1980). One court noted that a psychiatrist employed
by a state mental hospital testified, "he could not recall ever not administering psychotropic medication to patients [admitted to the facility]." Walters v. Western State Hospital, 864 F.2d 695, 699
(10th Cir. 1988).
Perhaps ironically, the American Psychological Association has recently explored the advisability
of allowing licensed psychologists to prescribe antipsychotic drugs. That, of course, does not necessarily.change or affect the Association's position respecting the involuntary administration of such
drugs. See Opinion and Letters to the Editor, 22 APA MONITOR 3 (1991).
34. A New Jersey public advocate agency submitted an amicus brief in favor of the independent
psychiatrist model of review. Brief for the New Jersey Dep't of the Public Advocate as Amicus
Curiae in Support of Respondent at 36-38, Harper(No. 88-599). The Brief described Nety Jersey's
experience with independent and internal review mechanisms, noting that in 1980 external review by
an independent psychiatrist resulted in discontinuation or reduction of 59% of antipsychotic mcdication dosages. Id. at 6, 36-38. After New Jersey resorted to an internal peer review system, that
percentage dropped to 2.47% of cases. Id.
In its amicus brief, the American Psychological Association argued for an interdisciplinary expert
panel: "This body should include professionals who are not employees of the prison, and who represent a variety of disciplines (e.g., psychologists, psychiatrists, psychiatric social workers, internists
and others) whose views concerning antipsychotic medication may balance one another." Brief of
the American Psychological Ass'n, supra note 2, at 29.
35. Washington v. Harper, 110 S. Ct. at 1043.
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Finally, Harper suggested a third due process deficiency: if a patient
was not entitled to a judge, or to independent professional review, then at
least he should be entitled to be represented by counsel at the internal
review hearing.3 6 The Court summarily dismissed this argument, stating: "[It] is less than crystal clear why lawyers must be available to iden37
tify possible errors in medical judgment.,
C. Summary of the Concurring Opinion
Justice Blackmun's two-paragraph concurrence is noteworthy for
two reasons. First, he made reference to the amici briefs submitted to the
Court by the American Psychiatric Association and the American Psychological Association - briefs which were. in direct opposition to each
other.38 The opposing briefs dramatically illustrated that the mental
health community was deeply divided over the issue of forcible medication with antipsychotic drugs.3 9

Second, Justice Blackmun suggested that the controversy about forcible medication might be lessened if state mental institutions were required to formally commit patients who showed signs of significant
incompetency. However, most states already require a formal commitment hearing before patients can be involuntarily confined to state
mental health institutions. Perhaps Justice Blackmun meant that states
should require courts to decide whether a patient is legally incompetent
as part of the involuntary commitment hearing. Although such a suggestion essentially aligns Justice Blackmun with the dissent, he did not explain why he chose to concur with the majority opinion.
36. Id. at 1044.
37. Id. (quoting Walters v. National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 330 (1985)).
38. See Brief for the American Psychiatric Ass'n, supra note 2; Brief of the American Psychological Ass'n, supra note 2.
39. The two opposing sides in this dispute are emphatic in their positions. For instance, the
American Psychological Association states: "Because antipsychotic drugs have grave effects, inherent potential for abuse, and an actual history of indiscriminate use by the psychiatric profession,
forcible administration of these drugs requires review by an independent decisionmaker in a manner
comporting with due process." Brief of the American Psychological Ass'n, supra note 2, at 2,
Harper (No. 88-599).
The American Psychiatric Association endorses antipsychotic drug treatment with equal and opposite rigor: Antipsychotic medications "are the treatment of choice for large numbers of persons
suffering from the most severe forms of mental illness... [they are] widely accepted in the psychiatric community as an extraordinarily effective treatment for both acute and chronic psychosis, particularly schizophrenia." Brief for the American Psychiatric Ass'n, supra note 2, at 10-11.
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D. Summary of the Dissenting Opinion
Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, began his
dissenting opinion with a scathing rebuke of the majority, bringing them

to task for approving a "mock trial before an institutionally biased tribunal."' According to the dissent, the majority gave Harper a substantive
liberty interest in avoiding unwanted medication with antipsychotic
drugs, but then it virtually ignored that interest by discounting the severe
results of antipsychotic drug treatment.4 1 The dissent, unlike the majority, was primarily concerned with the side effects of these drugs, ptrticu-

larly when their use entails a substantial risk of permanent injury and
premature death,4 2 and when they have a profound effect on a person's
thought processes. Therefore, forced administration of such drugs was a
deprivation of liberty in the most literal and fundamental sense. 43 Because Harper had never been adjudged insane or incompetent, he had a

fundamental right to refuse treatment.'
Thus, the dissent agreed with Harper that a competent person in a

non-emergency situation had an absolute liberty interest in refusing antipsychotic medication. To buttress the dissent's analysis, Justice Stevens
pointed to a growing body of state court decisions which had similarly
required a judicial determination of incompetence before the state could
45
involuntarily medicate patients or prisoners with antipsychotic drugs.
The majority's three-pronged standard was inadequate, then, be40. Washington v. Harper, 110 S.Ct. at 1045 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 1045.
43. Id.
44. Id. at n.2.
45. Id. at 1055 n.31. States requiring such a determination of incompetency now include California, Colorado, Massachusetts, New York, Oklahoma, and Wisconsin. See, e.g., Riese v. St.
Mary's Hosp. & Med. Center, 271 Cal. Rptr. 199 (1st Dist. 1987) (absent judicial determination of
incompetency, involuntary patient's informed consent required before treatment with antipsychotic
drugs); People v. Medina, 705 P.2d 961 (Colo. 1985) (absent emergency situation that poses an
immediate threat of harm, antipsychotic medicine may be administered to a nonconsenting mentally
ill patient only after the trial court is satisfied by clear and convincing evidence that the patient is
incompetent); Rivers v. Katz, 495 N.E.2d 337 (N.Y. 1986) (before a state may use itsparenspatriae
power as justification for forceful administration of mind-altering drugs, there must be a determination that the individual lacks the capacity to decide for himself; such a determination is a uniquely
judicial, not medical, function and should be made at a hearing); In re Mental Health of K.K.B., 609
P.2d 747 (Okla. 1980) (involuntary treatment in non-emergency situations requires instigation of
judicial proceeding to have the patient declared legally incompetent and to appoint guardian to make
informed decision for the patient).
Other states, although not requiring a determination of incompetency, do require a judicial assessment of the need for forcible medication at a formal hearing. See, e.g., In re Mental Commitment of
M.P., 510 N.E.2d 645 (Ind.1987) (a court must determine by clear, convincing evidence that prob-
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cause it failed to take into account the patient's legal competency. The
dissent further noted that, even if it were to accept the majority's standard, whereby a patient could be forcibly medicated so long as he was
mentally ill, dangerous, and medication was in his medical interest, the
prison policy itself failed to meet that standard.' The policy, by its own
terms, allowed for forcible medication without any finding of medical
benefit.47 In fact, it made no reference whatsoever to expected medical
benefit, authorizing instead long-term involuntary medication to any
mentally-ill prisoner who appeared to present a future risk to himself or
even to mere property. 48 The state readily admitted that use of antipsychotic drugs provided a means of managing an unruly prison population and preventing property damage.4 9
Justice Stevens concluded that the state's prison policy was constitutionally deficient, because it "sweepingly sacrifice[d] the inmate's substantive liberty interest to refuse psychotropic drugs, regardless of his
medical interests, to institutional and administrative concerns."50 Antipsychotic drugs were prescribed not for medical purposes, but to control
or to discipline mentally-iU patients.
In its procedural analysis, the dissent criticized the State's policy for
its failure to have the treatment decision made or reviewed by an impartial person or tribunal."1 The dissent asserted that any decision approving such drugs must be made by an independent professional concerned
not with institutional interests, but only with the individual's best interests. 2 The choice was not between "medical experts on the one hand
and judges on the other," but rather between "decisionmakers who are
53
biased and those who are not."
The decisionmakers in Harper's case had two conflicts of interest.
First, they were part of an in-house system that required colleagues to
able benefit from proposed treatment outweighs risk of harm); Jarvis v. Levine, 418 N.W.2d 139

(Minn. 1988).
46. Washington v. Harper, 110 S. Ct. at 1048.
47. Id.
48. Id. "In order for involuntary medication to be approved, it must be demonstrated that the
inmate suffers from a mental disorder and as a result... constitutes a likelihood of serious harm to
himself or others... or a substantial risk that physical harm will be inflicted by an individual upon
the property of others.. ." (quoting Record at 1, Book 9, Policy 600.30, Harper(No. 88-599)).
49. Washington v. Harper, 110 S. Ct. at 1049 n.12 (citing Petitioner's Brief at 17, 29).
50. Id. at 1049.
51. Id. at 1052.
52. Id.
53. Id. at n.20.
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review and possibly override the treatment decisions of one another. 4
Arguably, it is not uncommon for colleagues to avoid second-guessing
one another. Furthermore, although a treating physician was barred by
the prison policy from participating in the initial committee decision, he
could participate in all other periodic reviews to determine if forcible
treatment should continue." The prison policy thus allowed a treating
physician to participate in a review of his own decision. Secondly, the
panel members could not exercise independent professional medical judgment because they were mandated by prison policy to be concerned not
only with the patient's medical interests, but also with the most convenient means of controlling'the mentally disturbed prisoner. 6 The panel
had to take into account not only the patient's treatment needs but also
the institution's separate interest. Hence, none of the decisionmakers in
Harper's case could claim independence of professional medical
7
judgment.The dissent summed up its procedural analysis with the following
pithy assessment: "Institutional control infect[ed] the decisionmakers
and the entire procedure." 8 Referring once again to the growing body
of state court decisions which had invalidated similar internal review
procedures, the dissent concluded that the Washington State Supreme
Court was correct in holding that a judicial decisionmaker was required
to resolve the competing individual and state interest claims.59
E. Impact of Harper Decision
The following analysis advances the argument that the Supreme
Court had the opportunity in Harperto forge a compromise in the emotionally charged issues surrounding forcible medication with antipsychotic drugs, but it chose instead to stake out an unnecessarily
extreme position.
Particularly with regard to the issue of whether a judicial hearing is
required by due process, the Court turned its back on the sensible, middle approach of having an independent professional review, either by a
psychiatrist from outside the institution or by an interdisciplinary panel
of mental health professionals.' Such an alternative form of review
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id.
Id. at 1053.
Id.
Id. at n.24.
Id. at 1055.
Id.
See discussion supra note 34.
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would have satisfied the majority's concern that judges are not adequately trained to make medical decisions and, conversely, would have
allayed the dissent's concern about endemic institutional bias. It also
would have protected the interests of the parties involved in such disputes, including non-consenting patients, mental health institutions and
the staffs and officials that run them, as well as the two segments of the
mental health establishment which have found themselves in bitter disagreement over forcible medication - the psychiatrists and the psychologists.6 1 Many lower courts in the 1980s attempted a thoughtful, balanced
approach to this issue.6" The significance of the Supreme Court's failure
to endorse a compromise position can only be fully understood in light of
the development of forcible medication law in the lower courts, particularly the lower federal courts. An overview of this development follows.
II.

OVERVIEW OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF FORCIBLE MEDICATION
LAW IN THE LOWER FEDERAL COURTS

In 1978 and 1979, the United States District Courts for New Jersey
and Massachusetts, in two landmark decisions - Rogers v. Okin 63 and
Rennie v. Klein 6 - ruled that patients who have been involuntarily
committed to state mental institutions have a federal constitutional right
61. This may be an overstatement, given the longstanding resistance of the psychiatric profession to both informed consent by mentally ill patients and to any outside review of drug treatment
decisions. See Loren H. Roth, The Right to Refuse Psychiatric Treatment:Law and Medicine at the

Interface, 35 EMORY L. J. 139, 143 (1986) ('[p]atient autonomy is something new for medicine and
psychiatry.... Information is given to patients largely to achieve their compliance, not to involve
the patient in decision making."). See also CHARLES LIDZ ET. AL., INFORMED CONSENT: A STUDY
OF DECISIONMAKING IN PSYCHIATRY (1984).
However, a leading psychiatric apologist recently indicated that some sort of internal peer review
of treatment decisions may be acceptable to his profession:
where are substantial reasons to favor... independent review of the appropriateness of
care.... Placing unbridled discretion in the hands of a single clinician has often led to
unskillful and at times unfortunate use of medications. This is particularly true in some
of our public facilities, which historically have had difficulties recruiting and supporting
competent clinicians. Unfortunately, in some areas those problems continue today. If
we truly believe that committed patients have the right to receive adequate care whether we attribute the right to their Fourteenth Amendment interests or to some
other source - the independent review model... provides essential protection for that
right.
Paul S. Appelbaum, The Right to Refuse Treatment With Antipsychotic Medications:Retrospectand
Prospect, 145 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 413, 418 (1988).

62. See cases cited supra notes 5-6.
63. Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Mass. 1979), cert. granted,451 U.S. 906 (1981).
64. Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131 (D.N.J. 1978) (motion for preliminary injunction denied), 476 F. Supp. 1294 (D.N.J. 1979) (complaint amended to add class action on behalf of all
patients hospitalized).
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to refuse treatment with antipsychotic drugs. The two decisions generated enormous controversy in the mental health and legal establishments6" because they conferred a right to mentally ill patients which
never existed before. 6 It had been a long-standing assumption of both
law and psychiatry that persons admitted involuntarily into mental insti-

tutions had no capacity to give informed consent or to participate meaningfully in treatment decisions.

Law and psychiatry assumed, as well,

that involuntary commitment was synonymous with involuntary treatment, and that the state mechanism of involuntary commitment was
designed to provide mandatory care and treatment for those who could

not care for themselves.6" In addition, it was an incontrovertible fact

that the treatment of choice of the psychiatric profession was overwhelmingly antipsychotic drug treatment.6 9
The Rogers and Rennie courts radically changed these assumptions.
Judge Tauro, in the Rogers opinion, reasoned that committed patients
were presumptively competent because the state's commitment proceedings did not include findings of insanity or legal incompetency.7 0 Therefore, patients had a privacy right71 under the Constitution to be let alone,
and they could only be forcibly treated with antipsychotic drugs after
being adjudged incompetent in a court hearing.7 2 If a patient was found
to be incompetent by the judge, the court would appoint a guardian to
make a substitute decision. 3 The requirement of a judicial hearing prior
65. See Roth, supra note 61, at 152 (author describes Rennie and Rogers as "blockbuster cases"
which ushered in a decade of controversy and bitter disagreement between the courts and the psychiatric profession). See also Anderson, supra note 33; Bickers, supra note 33.
66. Roth, supra note 61, at 144-46.
67. Id.; see also LIDZ ET AL., supra note 61, at 20-21.
68. For a concise treatment of the legal and psychiatric theories of involuntary commitment
before and after Rennie and Rogers, see Appelbaum, supra note 61. See also Steven Shobat, Comment, Pathway Through the PsychotropicJungle: The Right to Refuse PsychotropicDrugs in Illinois,
18 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 407, 437-39 (1985).
69. See, e g., Brief for the American Psychiatric Ass'n, supra note 2, at 16 ("the use of available
antipsychotic agents continues to be the cornerstone of management of these serious and disabling
mental illnesses" (quoting Ross J. Baldessarini & Joseph F. Lipinski, Risks ofAntipsychotic Drugs
Overemphasized, 305 NEw ENG. J. MED. 588 (1981))); see also Brief for the American Psychiatric
Ass'n, supra note 2, at 10 ("Antipsychotic (neuroleptic) drugs remain the primary modality in the
treatment of an acute episode or an acute exacerbation of a schizophrenic illness." (quoting John M.
Kane, Treatment of Schizophrenia, 13 SCHIZOPHRENIA BULL. 133, 134 (1987))).
70. Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342, 1361-64 (D. Mass. 1979).
71. Id. at 1365-67 (Judge Tauro based his holding in favor of the patients' right to refuse treatment absent an emergency situation on a broad right of privacy, as well as a First Amendment right
to think and make treatment decisions free from the intrusion of mind-altering drugs).
72. Id. at 1361-62.
73. Id. at 1362-64.
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to forcible drugging could only be circumvented in a narrow emergency
situation, in which the patient could be involuntarily medicated for limited periods of time when he posed a substantial likelihood of physical
harm to himself or others.7 4
In Rennie," Judge Brotman, after citing extensive evidence of indiscriminate use of antipsychotic drugs in New Jersey's mental hospitals,7 6
found that patients had a privacy right to refuse treatment with antipsychotic drugs. 7 7 However, he reasoned that due process did not require a judicial proceeding. Instead, fairness and accuracy would be
satisfied by an in-hospital review, at which an independent psychiatrist
from outside the institution would serve as judge.7" The patient would be

represented by a patient advocate.79 On appeal,"0 the Third Circuit affirmed Judge Brotman's finding of a substantive due process right to refuse" but held that the state's in-house review procedures were sufficient.
These procedures allowed the patient's treatment team and the hospital

medical director to make the final decision to involuntarily medicate,
rather than requiring review by an outside, independent decisionmaker s2
Both cases went through extensive appeals,83 traveling all the way to
74. Id. at 1364-65. On appeal, the First Circuit expanded Judge Tauro's formulation of an
emergency to include significant "deterioration in the patient's mental health." Rogers v. Okin, 634
F.2d 650, 660 (1st Cir. 1980). The issue of what constitutes an emergency for purposes of forcible
medication has been hotly contested in the courts. Some courts have held, as Judge Tauro did in
Rogers, that an emergency situation arises only when the patient poses an immediate and substantial
threat of physical harm to himself or others. See, eg., People v. Medina, 705 P.2d 961 (Colo. 1985)
(an emergency poses immediate and substantial threat to the life or safety of the patient or others in
the hospital); In re Mental Health of K.K.B., 609 P.2d 747 (Okla. 1980) (the state does not have the
right to forcibly administer psychotropic drugs in non-emergency situations under itsparenspatriae
power).
Other courts - including the Rogers circuit court and the New York Court of Appeals in Rivers
v. Katz, 495 N.E.2d 337 (1986) - have held that an emergency situation can also exist when the
patient poses non-imminent harm to himself in the form of deterioration in his mental health, a
situation which has been called a "psychiatric" emergency as distinct from an imminent physical
emergency. See 8MENTAL & PHYs.DISAB. L. REP. 82, 83-85 (1984) for a discussion of the various
legal definitions of "emergency" in the forcible medication context.
75. Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131 (D.NJ. 1978) (motion for preliminary injunction denied), 476 F. Supp. 1294 (D.N.J. 1979) (complaint amended to add class action and temporary
injunctive relief granted).
76. Rennie v. Klein, 476 F. Supp. at 1299-1303 (D.NJ. 1979).
77. Id. at 1307.
78. Id. at 1306-12.
79. Id. at 1311-12.
80. Rennie v. Klein, 653 F.2d 836 (3d Cir. 1981).
81. Id. at 841-44.
82. Id. at 848-51.
83. For detailed accounts of the Rogers and Rennie rulings in the district and circuit courts, see
Shari Lynne Kahn, Comment, The Right to Adequate Treatment Versus the Right to Refuse Anti-
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the United States Supreme Court.84 The Supreme Court declined to review the decisions on their merits; nevertheless, the Court's dictum in
Rogers was subsequently accepted as law by many federal circuit
courts: 5 "involuntarily committed mental patients do retain liberty interests protected directly by the Constitution, and these interests are implicated by the involuntary administration of antipsychotic drugs."86
Rogers and Rennie set forth the basic premise that patients have a
constitutional right to refuse treatment. They also delineated three distinct approaches for deciding under what circumstances a patient could
be forcibly medicated. Rogers indicated such a decision, absent an emergency situation, could only be made by a judge.8 7 Rennie, at the district
court level, held that nonjudicial review was constitutionally adequate
but must be made by an independent medical professional from outside
the institution; 8 Rennie, at the circuit court level, also called for nonjudicial decisionmaking but relaxed the standard further by allowing for
purely internal staff review. 9
Rogers and Rennie spawned a host of lawsuits in other federal 90 and
state courts 91 brought by institutionalized patients who had been forced
to take antipsychotic drugs. The overwhelming majority of these courts
followed the lead of Rennie and Rogers, granting mental patients a constitutional right to refuse treatment with antipsychotic drugs, subject to
an emergency exception. 92 Most courts held that the federal right to refuse treatment was grounded in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 93 and stressed that the liberty interest of the patient
was significant, because antipsychotic drugs carry a well established high
psychotic Drug Treatment: A Solution to the Dilemma of the Involuntarily Committed Psychiatric
Patient, 33 EMORY L.J. 441, 462-72 (1984); Shobat, supra note 68, at 419-24.
84. Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982); Rennie v. Klein, 458 U.S. 1119 (1982).
85. See cases cited supra notes 5-6 (after the Supreme Court's dictum in Rogers, virtually every
court held that patients had a liberty interest in avoiding unwanted medication grounded in the
Fourteenth Amendment).
86. Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. at 299 n.16.
87. Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342, 1361-62, 1371 (D. Mass. 1979).
88. Rennie v. Klein, 476 F. Supp. at 1310 (D.N.J. 1979).
89. Rennie v. Klein, 653 F.2d 836, 848-51 (3d Cir. 1981).
90. See cases cited supra note 5.
91. See cases cited supra note 6.
.92. See supra note 74, for legal definitions of what constitutes an emergency for forcible medication purposes.
93. For a discussion of the different constitutional theories advanced in early court decisions in
support of the right to refuse treatment, see Bickers, supra note 33, at 90-101; Kahn supra note 83, at
457-62.
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risk of severe and sometimes irreversible side effects.94
Despite a general trend throughout the 1980s toward according
mental patients a due process right to refuse, there was confusion and
lack of uniformity in courts' holdings. In particular, courts disagreed significantly about who should make the decision to override a patient's

refusal. Some followed Rogers, insisting that the decision to medicate
involuntarily must be a judicial one.95 Other courts, following the district court's approach in Rennie, held that the decision to override the
patient's wishes was primarily a medical one, but due process dictated
use of an outside professional decisionmaker.96 Still other courts9 7 held
that internal medical review constituted sufficient due process, following
the lead of the Rennie circuit court.
Likewise, the courts were divided on the related issue of competency/incompetency. This debate centered on the question: did mentally ill patients enjoy a presumption of competency which could only be
overridden by a judicial finding of incompetency? The reasoning of the
Fourth Circuit in U.S. v. Charters98 typified many court decisions of the
period: "[m]entally ill patients, though incapacitated for particular
purposes, can be competent to make decisions concerning their medical
care .... 99 However, some courts maintained the traditional notion
that commitment automatically meant incompetency and involuntary

treatment.1° °
A United States Supreme Court decision announced during this period added still another issue for the courts to ponder. In Youngberg v.
94. See discussion supra note 8.
95. See discussion supra note 45.
96. A mixed internal/external review procedure was approved by a federal district court in
Texas in R.A.J. v. Miller, 590 F. Supp. 1319 (N.D. Tex. 1984) (decision to forcibly administer
psychotropic drugs within the treating physician's discretion for the first fourteen days; thereafter,
clinical director to determine whether forced medication was medically appropriate; treatment
would continue unless patient's ability to understand consequences of his refusal was not impaired
by his mental illness; in that case, a consulting psychiatrist, not employed by the Texas Department
of Mental Health, would be brought in to make an independent determination).
97. United States v. Leatherman, 580 F. Supp. 977 (D.D.C. 1983), appeal dismissed, 729 F.2d
863 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (treatment could commence over patient's objection after consultation with
Patient Advocate and patient's family, and after completion of administrative review within the
hospital); Davis v. Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. 915 (N.D. Ohio 1980) (due process does not require peer
review by professionals outside the State Department of Mental Health).
98. United States v. Charters, 829 F.2d 479 (4th Cir. 1987), reh'ggranted, 863 F.2d 302 (4th
Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1317 (1990).
99. Id. at 488.
100. One court held, "[ain involuntary commitment is a finding of incompetency with respect to
treatment decisions. Nonconsensual treatment is what involuntary commitment is all about." Stensvad v. Reivitz, 601 F. Supp 128, 131 (W.D. Wis. 1985).
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Romeo, 10 1 decided two years after the district court decisions in Rogers10 2 and Rennie,103 the Supreme Court considered the due process
rights of an involuntarily committed mentally retarded individual, who
alleged that hospital administrators unconstitutionally deprived him of
his liberty by subjecting him to physical restraints." The Court held
that such a person had a liberty interest, grounded in the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, in "freedom from unreasonable
05
restraints." 1
Although the Court accorded Romeo a due process right, it held
that this right only entitled him to an assurance that professional judgment was exercised in making the decision to restrain him: "[T]he Constitution only requires that the courts make certain that professional
judgment in fact was exercised. It is not appropriate for the courts to
specify which of several professionally acceptable choices should have
been made." 10 6
The Court explained the rationale behind its "deference to professional judgment" standard as follows:
[W]e emphasize that courts must show deference to the judgment exercised
by a qualified professional .... [T]here certainly is no reason to think
judges or juries are better qualified than appropriate professionals in making such decisions. . . .For these reasons, the decision, if made by a professional, is presumptively valid; liability may be imposed only when the
decision by the professional is such a substantial departure from accepted
professional judgment, practice, or standards as to demonstrate that the
person responsible actually did not base the decision on such a judgment.107
This standard gave treating physicians in state mental health institutions
sole discretion in overriding a patient's constitutional right to refuse
treatment. Further, it severely limited the scope of judicial review of
such a deprivation by mandating judicial deference to professional medical judgment. The Supreme Court strictly limited judicial scrutiny to the
determination of whether the physician was grossly negligent in restraining the patient. 10 Constitutional standards and inquiries were to
101. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
102. Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Mass. 1979), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 634 F.2d
650 (Ist Cir. 1980), 451 U.S. 906 (1981), vacated sub nom., Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982).
103. Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131 (D.N.J. 1978), 476 F. Supp. 1294 (D.N.J. 1979),
104. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 314-16 (1982).
105. Id. at 321.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 322-23.
108. Id. at 314 (citing with approval the Third Circuit concurrence of Judge Seitz, who equated
the deference standard with the standards courts apply to medical malpractice claims).
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be eschewed in favor of a narrow negligence inquiry. 9
Although Youngberg did not deal with the administration of antipsychotic drugs, it opened the possibility that its facts and standards
might be applied to right-to-refuse cases. Indeed, many federal courts
subsequently applied the Youngberg standard of "freedom from unreasonable restraint" to antipsychotic drug cases."' One court wrote, "[i]f
incarcerated individuals retain a liberty interest in freedom from bodily
restraints of the kind in Romeo then afortiorithey have a liberty interest
in freedom from physical and mental restraint of the kind potentially
imposed by antipsychotic drugs." ' ' Courts also addressed the question
whether the Youngberg "deference to professional judgment" standard
applied to antipsychotic drug refusal. If so, psychiatrists from within the

institution retained complete discretion regarding the decision to involuntarily medicate, and courts could only inquire after involuntary treatment had already occurred whether professional judgment to medicate

was in fact exercised.
The federal courts were deeply divided on the appropriateness of
extending the "deference to professional judgment" test to drug refusal
cases. 12 A number of courts construed the Youngberg standard as being
applicable to forcible medication,11 3 holding that so long as professional
judgment was in fact exercised, the patient's right to refuse could be
overridden by his treating physician without prior judicial intervention

and without prior medical peer review.
109. For an insightful discussion of the clash of constitutional values and the negligence/malpractice underpinnings of the deference doctrine, see Patrick Wiseman, Deferringto the Judgment of
Mental Health and Related Professionals in Striking the ConstitutionalBalance Between Individual
Liberty and the Interests of the State, 19 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REv. 281 (1988).
110. See, eg., United States v. Watson, 893 F.2d 970 (8th Cir. 1990), reh'g granted in part,
vacatedin part, 900 F.2d 1322 (8th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 3243 (1990); Dautremont v.
Broadlawns Hospital, 827 F.2d 291 (8th Cir. 1987); United States v. Charters, 829 F.2d 479 (4th Cir.
1987), reh'g en banc, 863 F.2d 302 (4th Cir. 1988), cert denied, 110 S. Ct. 1317 (1990); Bee v.
Greaves, 744 F.2d 1387 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1214; Johnson v. Silvers, 742 F.2d
823 (4th Cir. 1984).
111. Bee v. Greaves, 744 F.2d at 1393.
112. See infra notes 113-14.
113. See, eg., United States v. Charters, 863 F.2d at 312 ("Fairly specific guidance has been
provided by the Supreme Court. The basic principle is that a legally institutionalized mental patient
is entitled to the exercise of 'professional judgment' by those who have the responsibility for making
medical decisions that affect his retained liberty interests."); Dautremont v. Broadlawns Hospital,
827 F.2d at 300 (stating that "[t]he decisions to administer psychotherapeutic drugs against Dautremont's will were made by professionals exercising their professional judgment" and further, that
"[Dautremont's] liberty [was] outweighed by... the professionals' reasonable judgment"); Johnson
v. Silvers, 742 F.2d at 825 ("Johnson, in order to prevail, must show that the.., defendant...
required him to take antipsychotic drugs without exercising professional judgment.").
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Other courts held that the facts in Youngberg were not controlling
in antipsychotic drug cases,' for a number of reasons. First, Romeo
was an incompetent, profoundly mentally retarded individual who was
never able to make informed consent treatment decisions for himself."II

By contrast, as many courts were increasingly finding, mentally ill patients were not necessarily incompetent and unable to make medical
treatment decisions. 11 6 Second, Romeo was restrained with temporary
arm restraints.1 1 7 Antipsychotic drugs, unlike arm restraints, could
cause permanent and severe harm, hence the liberty interests at stake

were much more significant and required greater protection than a deference standard could afford.

Third, deference to medical professionals was arguably more appropriate in Youngberg because the decision was more narrowly a medical

one. Treatment with antipsychotic drugs, by contrast, involved personal,
constitutionally implicated values. As one court stated: "the decision
whether forcibly to medicate ... is not exclusively a professional judgment. Although there is certainly a component of medical knowledge
required, the decision also involves an evaluation of the personal risks
and benefits of undertaking the proposed course of treatment that goes
beyond medical expertise." 1 18 The same court asserted that it was inapapply the [Youngberg] formula...
propriate to "mechanically adopt and
19
Court."'
Supreme
the
by
outlined
Another court opinion articulated a more philosophical objection to
the application of the deference standard to drug refusal cases:
114. See, eg., United States v. Watson, 893 F.2d at 979 n.14 ("Certainly Youngberg does not
deal with this situation.., where the unmedicated inmate can function adequately within the general inmate population and is a threat neither to himself or others. . ."); Walters v. Western State
Hospital, 864 F.2d 695, 697 (10th Cir. 1988) ("Absent an emergency, legally competent persons
involuntarily committed to mental facilities have the constitutional right to refuse treatment with
psychotropic medication .... 'This principle need not give way to medical judgment' ") (quoting In
re K.K.B., 609 P.2d 747, 749 (Okla. 1980)); United States v. Charters, 829 F.2d at 488 ("The restraints which had been applied to Romeo were temporary.... Antipsychotic drugs, on the other
hand, may well cause serious and irreversible injury in a significant percentage of cases."); Bee v.
Greaves, 744 F.2d at 1396 n.7 ("Romeo is distinguishable both because it involved temporary physical restraints rather than mental restraints with potentially long term effects, and because Romeo
had been certified as severely retarded and unable to care for himself....").
115. See, eg., Bee v. Greaves, 744 F.2d at 1396 n.7 ("Romeo is distinguishable ... because
Romeo had been certified as severely retarded and unable to care for himself...
116. See text accompanying notes 98-99 supra.
117. See, eg., United States v. Charters, 829 F.2d at 489 ("The restraints which had been applied to Romeo were temporary.... Antipsychotic drugs, on the other hand, may well cause serious
and irreversible injury in a significant percentage of cases.").
118. Id.
119. Id. at 490.
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The Youngberg proposition that there is "no reason to think judges or juries
are better qualified than appropriate professionals in making [treatment]
decisions" may not be reasonably disputed. Conversely, however, I do not
believe that there can be any quarrel with the proposition that those professionals are not better qualified than
judges or juries in balancing delicate
2°
constitutional rights and duties.
According to a leading psychiatric commentator, the various standards shaped by the district and circuit courts in Rogers and Rennie and

by the circuit courts following the Supreme Court decision in Youngberg,
set forth the essential conflict between law and medicine posed by rightto-refuse cases:
Physicians ... object that judges now make medical decisions, while the
courts have ruled that these decisions involve a primacy of nonmedical factors ....
[T]he law is now struggling to decide whether it is better social
policy to have judges make quasi-medical decisions or have doctors make
quasi-judicial ones. Perhaps not surprisingly, this is the same question that
was asked some twenty years ago concerning civil commitment when physicians committed patients to psychiatric hospitals without judicial procedures. The locus of inquiry has moved from the hospital 12
door
to the
1
treating room, but the conceptual problem remains the same.
Against this backdrop of numerous and conflicting federal court decisions and approaches, the United States Supreme Court granted certio-

rari to review the Washington State Supreme Court decision in
Washington v. Harper. This case offered the Supreme Court the opportunity to directly rule on the issue of forcible medication with antipsychotic
drugs and, perhaps, to resolve some of the key differences among the
lower courts.
III.

DOES AN INVOLUNTARILY COMMITTED PATIENT RETAIN A
PRESUMPTION OF LEGAL COMPETENCE AND THUS A
RIGHT TO REFUSE INVOLUNTARY TREATMENT
WITH ANTIPSYCHOTIC DRUGS IN THE
ABSENCE OF AN EMERGENCY?

As explained in Part II of this Note, in the decade preceding the
Supreme Court's Harper decision, many lower federal and state courts
recognized that involuntarily committed patients were not necessarily
unable to make their own assessments regarding the risks associated with
120. In re Mental Commitment of M.P., 500 N.E.2d 216, 225 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986) (Sullivan, J.,
dissenting), vacated, 510 N.E.2d 645 (Ind. 1987). Sullivan's influential dissent was quoted in subsequent federal court decisions, including United States v. Charters, 829 F.2d at 490 n.14.
121. Roth, supra note 61, at 150.
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antipsychotic drugs. 122 These courts determined mental patients were
presumptively competent and could be medicated against their will only
after a court had found them incompetent in a separate incompetency
hearing (separate from the initial commitment proceeding)., 3
The Supreme Court, in Harper, essentially ignored the question of
competency and incompetency and, hence, ignored the implications for
the right to refuse. The majority scarcely acknowledged that Harper had
not been adjudged insane or incompetent, despite the dissent's insistence
on the legal importane of this fact. 2 4 It thereby implicitly rejected the
principle that competent mental patients retained a legal right to refuse
treatment in non-emergency situations.
The Court's position will not invalidate previous federal and state
court decisions which allowed competent patients an absolute right to
refuse, so long as those decisions were based on state statutes or state
constitutions. 125 However, in terms of future impact, the ruling in
Harperseems to mandate that any .right to refuse which is grounded in a
patient's legal competency cannot be supported by the Due Process
Clause of the Federal Constitution, but instead must be grounded in state
law.
IV.

DoEs THE SUPREME COURT'S "DEFERENCE TO PROFESSIONAL

JUDGMENT" STANDARD, AS ARTICULATED IN YOUNGBERG V. ROMEO,

APPLY TO RIGHT-TO-REFUSE CASES?
The answer to this much-debated issue is a resounding "yes." The
Supreme Court, in Harper, explicitly applied the "deference to professional judgment" standard to antipsychotic drug administration,12 6 dispelling the notion that the dangerous and intrusive nature of these drugs
demanded greater legal protection than the deference standard afforded.
The issue of deference to professionals was unquestionably among the
most important aspects of the majority's holding, and the part most damaging to mentally ill patients' right to refuse. Deference effectively nulli122. See text and quote accompanying notes 98-99 supra.
123. See Appelbaum, supra note 61; Shobat, supra note 68, at 437-39.
124. Washington v. Harper, 110 S. Ct. 1028, 1045 n.2 (1990) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part).
125. See id. at 1047 n.9 (listing decisions which have based the right to refuse on state statutes
or state constitutions). See also United States v. Watson, 893 F.2d 970, 977 n.1 1 (8th Cir. 1990)
(listing state courts which have based a right to refuse in nonemergency situations on state statutes
and/or state constitutions), reh'ggranted in part, opinion vacated in part, United States v. Holmes,
900 F.2d 1322 (8th Cir. 1990), cert denied, Watson v. United States, 110 S. Ct. 3243 (1990).
126. Washington v. Harper, 110 S. Ct. at 1042-43.

1992]

WASHINGTON v. HARPER

fled the right to refuse because it rendered that right almost completely
unprotected against state intrusion.
The implications for patients who wish to refuse medication in the
future seem clear: under the Harper extension of the deference standard
to antipsychotic drug refusal, the patient's constitutional right to refuse
can be overruled by a medical professional, so long as that professional
can show he or she exercised so-called professional judgment. Since professional judgment in the psychiatric profession is virtually synonymous
with antipsychotic drug treatment,1 27 there will likely be few situations
where patients will have the ability to effectively exercise their constitutional right to refuse. Only when a psychiatrist is grossly negligent in
medicating a non-consenting patient will a patient have a legal basis for
judicial review.28
It is not clear why the Court chose to give constitutional protection
with one hand and essentially take it away with the other. One possible
explanation is that the Court was unduly preoccupied with the lack of
expertise of judges to decide medical matters. Though an understandable
concern, the Court failed to balance it against the countervailing arguto make decisions
ment that medical professionals lack legal expertise 129
duties."
and
rights
regarding "delicate constitutional
The Court did not consider the possibility of pursuing a middle
course between the extremes of active judicial intervention and unfettered physician discretion. It rejected the compromise between these extremes suggested by the American Psychological Association in its
amicus curiae brief; namely, that forcible medication decisions should be
subject to review by an "unbiased administrative body, [made up of] multidisciplinary mental health professionals whose views concerning antipsychotic medication may balance one another."1 0 Such a compromise
would give patients the benefit of an impartial review without involving
judges or significantly hampering the exercise of professional judgment.
Independent multidisciplinary review was also a more appropriate
way to deal with the very real scientific disagreements about the benefits
and effects of antipsychotic drugs. The Court explained in Youngberg'
that courts must defer to medical decisions, because it was inappropriate
127. See generally supra notes 33-34, 39 & 69.
128. Wiseman, supra note 109, at 284.
129. In re Mental Commitment of M.P., 500 N.E.2d 216, 225 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986) (Sullivan, J.,
dissenting), vacated, In re Mental Commitment of M.P., 510 N.E.2d 645 (Ind. 1987).
130. Brief of the American Psychological Ass'n, supra note 2, at 28-29.
131. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
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for judges to "specify which of several professionally acceptable choices
should have been made." ' 2 Yet, the effect of the Court's deference standard - and specifically its refusal to consider multidisciplinary peer review - was to endorse the psychiatric community's notion of acceptable
treatment practices and to exclude differing views from the decisionmak133
ing process.
The Court, ironically, did what it warned the lower courts not to do
- that is, favor one medical school of thought over competing schools of
thought. Though the Supreme Court ostensibly intended to keep the law
out of the sphere of controversial medical judgments, it entered the medical fray and sided with the psychiatric profession in an area of scientific
uncertainty and nonconsensus. The Court should have heeded its own
admonitions and left the task of resolving competing scientific judgments
to professional bodies representing the breadth of opinion in the mental
health field.
There are other sound legal reasons why the deference standard
should not have been applied to antipsychotic drug refusal. The deference standard rests on the assumption that the liberty interest of a mentally ill patient in refusing antipsychotic drugs is a purely medical
interest, involving a purely medical decision, and requiring, therefore, a
purely medical decisionmaker. Given such a conceptualization, patient
consultation and consent is beside the point. This approach is a legally
outmoded view of the relationship between physician and patient and,
according to a growing number of courts, it is legally outmoded whether
or not the patient has a physical or a mental problem.13 4 It fundamentally discounts the individual interests at stake and the nature of the decision to be made.
Although there is no question that the Harper deference standard
eliminated external review as a requirement of due process, it is plausible
that the Harper decision could be construed as requiring some sort of
internal review. The State of Washington provided Harper with an internal hearing conducted by a staff panel of medical and administrative personnel. Although the Supreme Court did not state explicitly that
internal review was necessary to satisfy due process (merely stating that
Washington's review procedures were "sufficient" to satisfy due pro132. Id. at 321 (quoting Romeo v. Youngberg, 644 F.2d 147, 178 (3d Cir. 1980) (Seitz, C.J.,
concurring)).
133. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
134. See supra notes 98-99 and applicable quote in text.
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cess. 3 ), the implication was that some sort of administrative review process was necessary to adequately protect the liberty interests of the
mentally ill.
If this is so, then the Harper decision may protect non-consenting
patients against forcible medication ordered unilaterally by a single practitioner. Such a reading of Harpercomports with those lower court opinions which have required internal review.13 6 Even before the Harper
ruling, a prominent psychiatric commentator observed that forcible medication decisions should always be subject to medical peer review before
being implemented:
Placing unbridled discretion in the hands of a single clinician has often led
to unskillful and at times unfortunate use of medication .... If we truly
believe that committed patients have the right to receive adequate care...
the independent
review model ... provides essential protection for that
137
right.

Although some sort of internal review is likely required by Harper,it is
not certain that such review is mandated, especially in light of the
Supreme Court's deference standard announced in Youngberg.1 38 There,
the Court repeatedly stated that single practitioners may make the decision to restrain and courts must defer so long as professional judgment
was exercised.1 39 Youngberg made single practitioners the sole arbiters
of their patients' constitutional liberty interests. In future litigation,
courts might be confronted with the argument that state mental health
institutions, under Youngberg, are not required to implement administrative procedures for internal peer review. The opposition would use
Harperto argue that internal review procedures are necessary to comport
with due process and that the decision to forcibly medicate must be a
collective one.
V.

WHAT PROCESS Is DUE?

The Supreme Court, in Harper, recognized that a patient-prisoner

had a due process right to refuse involuntary antipsychotic drug treatment. Once having accorded that right, the Court had to consider what
135. Washington v. Harper, 110 S. Ct. 1028, 1042-44 (1990).
136.
137.

See cases cited supra note 97.
Appelbaum, supra note 61, at 418.

138. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
139. Id. at 322-23 ("we emphasize that courts must show deference to the judgment exercised
by a qualified profpsional.... The decision, if made by a professional, is presumptively valid...")
(emphasis added tb the word "a" to underscore the point that the court continually refers to a single
qualified professional as able to make a professional judgment).
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process was due. The Court struck down the Washington Supreme
Court's requirement of a full adversarial hearing and, instead, upheld the
state's procedures, which included twenty-four hours notice of the decision to forcibly medicate, no right to legal counsel, no need for a judicial
decisionmaker or external medical review, and no right to appeal in court
except by extraordinary writ.4°
Regardless of whether one agrees with the dissent that these procedures amounted to a "mock trial,"14' 1 the process approved by the Court
flowed logically and inevitably from the Court's standard of deference to
professional judgment, discussed in Part IV of this Note. However, in
the end, the Court's position is perhaps best understood not in terms of
its deference standard, but rather in terms of its concern for institutional
stability. There was an explicit reluctance on the part of the Court to
add to the burdens of underfunded, understaffed, and poorly staffed state
mental hospitals.14 2 Underlying this reluctance was an implicit assumption that giving patients an option to go to court to protect their right to
refuse would unduly burden state mental institutions. The Court assumed that guaranteeing due process through the adversarial court system would have deleterious institutional results.
This assumption was challenged in an amicus curiae brief submitted
by the Mental Health Legal Advisors Committee of the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court.143 The brief cited the "salutary" 1" experience
Massachusetts has had with the judicial model of forcible medication
decisionmaking during the past eleven years since the landmark federal
district court ruling in Rogers v. Okin. 145
The impact of the Rogers decisions on the mental health system and on
people with mental illness in particular has been salutary. The rules of law
and the procedures established by the courts have insured that individual
rights are protected without seriously burdening the operation of the

mental health system. 146

140. Washington v. Harper, 110 S. Ct. 1028, 1033-34 (1990).
141. Id. at 1045.
142. Id. at 1042 ("Nor can we ignore the fact that requiring judicial hearings will divert scarce
prison resources, both money and the staff's time, from the care and treatment of mentally ill
inmates.").
143. Brief for the Mental Health Legal Advisors Committee of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court et al. as Amici Curiae at 16-18, Harper (No. 88-599) [hereinafter Brief of the Mental
Health Legal Advisors Committee].
144. Id. at 16.
145. Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Mass. 1979), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, Rogers v.
Okin, 634 F.2d 650 (Ist Cir. 1980), cert granted,Okin v. Rogers, 451 U.S. 906 (1981), vacated, Mills
v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982).
146. Brief of the Mental Health Legal Advisors Committee, supra note 143, at 16.
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The brief noted that many of the medical community's dire predictions
about the effects of judicial review had failed to materialize. These included predictions that: i) judicial review would put mental hospital staff
and patients at greater risk of physical injury; ii) the relationship between
physician and patient would become adversarial; iii) refusing patients
would go without needed drug treatment, thereby prolonging their hospital stays; and, iv) the courts would be clogged with forcible medication
review proceedings.14 7 None of these undesirable consequences had, in
fact, occurred.
Thus, according to a state agency which had observed the impact of
the Rogers decision over a long period of time, neither the courts nor the
state's mental health system had been adversely affected by judicial review. The Supreme Court's implicit assumption that due process should
be kept to a minimum when dealing with underfunded state mental institutions was not borne out by the experience of a state which had followed
the judicial approach.
Regardless of how the Court viewed the practical impact of judicial
involvement in forcible medication decisionmaking, it clearly rejected the
due process holding of Rogers.1 48 Harperwas a corrective holding, putting a halt to the Rogers line of due process decisions. Moreover, it
might have signaled the end to a decade of judicial activism in the federal
circuit and district courts in the area of forcible medication law. Patients
and their advocates sought relief in the federal courts and met with considerable judicial sympathy. Harper made clear that minimum "internal" due process, along with deference to professional judgment, are all
the federal constitutional protection non-consenting claimants will receive from the courts. Patients seeking more due process will have to
base their claims on state constitutional or statutory grounds - not on
the Federal Constitution.
VI.

WILL THE HOLDING IN HARPER EXTEND BEYOND PRISONERS

TO INCLUDE CIVILLY COMMITTED PATIENTS?

Walter Harper was a prisoner in a mental unit of a state prison hospital. This fact raises the question whether the Supreme Court's holding
applies narrowly to mentally ill prisoners or whether its influence will
extend to involuntarily incarcerated mental patients in general.
147. Id. at 16-18.
148. Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Mass. 1979), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, Rogers v.
Okin, 634 F.2d 650 (1st Cir. 1980), cerL granted,Okin v. Rogers 451 U.S. 906 (1981), vacated, Mills
v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982).
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The language of Harper's holding was explicitly prisoner-oriented.
The Court stated that, "given the requirements of the prison environment, the Due Process Clause permits the state to treat a prison inmate
who has a serious mental illness with antipsychotic drugs against his will,
if the inmate is dangerous to himself or others and the treatment is in the
inmate's medical interest."' 4 9 This holding was preceded by an extensive
discussion of the Court's long-established principle of deference to prison
officials.' 5 0 The Court concluded that here, as in its previous prison decisions, 15 1 prison regulations alleged to infringe constitutional rights "are
judged under a 'reasonableness' test less restrictive than that ordinarily
applied to alleged infringements of fundamental constitutional rights."" 2
Further underscoring the uniqueness of the prison setting, the Court
added: "There are few cases in which the state's interest in combating
the danger posed by a person to both himself and others is greater than in
a prison environment, which, 'by definition,' is made up of persons with
'a demonstrated proclivity for antisocial criminal, and often violent,
conduct.' """5
Thus, the Court explicitly directed its ruling to prison populations
and stated that the constitutional protections accorded to this group were
less than would ordinarily be accorded to other similarly situated, nonprison populations. The language and analysis of the Court seems, therefore, to lend strength to the assertion that Harper should be construed
narrowly to apply only to prison patients, 5 4 and furthermore, that civilly
committed patients might expect greater due process protections than
those given to Harper. That expectation was raised in the Youngberg 155
opinion by Justice Powell, when he opined that civilly incarcerated pa56
tients could expect "more considerate treatment.., than criminals."'
A more plausible reading of Harper,however, is that its basic premises will apply with equal force to civilly committed patients as well as to
prisoners. As this Note has already discussed, the Supreme Court in
149. Washington v. Harper, 110 S. Ct. 1028, 1039-40 (1990).
150. Id. at 1038.
151. Id. (citing Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987); Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor
Union, 433 U.S. 119 (1977)).
152. Id. (quoting O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 349 (1987)).
153. Id. (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526 (1984)).
154. The Supreme Court recently remanded a notorious prisoner case, Perry v. Louisiana, 11l
S. Ct. 449 (1990), reh'g denied, 111 S. Ct. 804 (1991), to the Louisiana district court for further
consideration in light of the Supreme Court's Harperruling. The issue in Perry was whether Louisiana may forcibly medicate a mentally insane inmate to make him mentally competent for execution.
155. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
156. Id. at 322.
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Harper adopted certain substantive and procedural standards (and rejected others) which had been fashioned by the lower federal courts.
These courts had not developed separate standards for civilly committed
patients and prisoners.157 The basic rights and procedures were essentially the same for both populations. That situation was not altered by
the Harperdecision; the Court's constitutional analysis was fully consistent with forcible medication law as developed in the federal and state
courts for civilly committed patients.
The parties in Harperexpressed the view that civilly committed patients were affected by the Washington Supreme Court's holding and
likewise would be affected by the United States Supreme Court's decision. The State of Washington, for example, in its Petition for a Writ of
Certiorari, asserted:
The Harper decision on its face deal[t] with the right of an incarcerated
felon to refuse medically prescribed antipsychotic medication. The decision
however [did] not by its terms limit the court's holding to that context...
[i]t is undeniable that persons who are not incarcerated felons have rights at
least coextensive with those of incarcerated felons. Thus, there is no doubt
that the court's decision applie[d] to civil committees .... 158
The Petition further stated, "the Washington State Supreme Court's decision ... if it is relied upon by federal courts or other state courts...
will affect the administration of psychiatric care in every jail, prison, and
psychiatric treatment facility." '59
The American Psychiatric Association, in its amicus brief, also contended that the state court holding in Harperwent beyond prisoners and
would affect thousands of mentally ill persons involuntarily confined
under state civil commitment statutes." The Association viewed this
issue as having a significant impact on all persons confined for treatment
to mental institutions. 161
Of course, just because the parties to a dispute (or interested nonparties) predict a broad construction of a holding it does not mean that
157. See, eg., United States v. Charters, 863 F.2d 302, 312 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 110 S.
Ct. 1317 (1990) (applying the [Youngberg] principle of deference to a prisoner, and stating that, "the
basic principle is that a legally institutionalizedmental patient is entitled to the exercise of professional judgment." (emphasis added)). The court in Charters made no distinction between types of
institutionalized mental patients. It assumed that the deference standard applied equally to a prisoner and a civilly committed patient. Id.
158. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of the State of Washington in the
Supreme Court of the United States at 6 n.6, Harper (No. 88-599).

159. Id. at 5-6.
160.
161.

Brief for the American Psychiatric Ass'n, supra note 2, at 7.
Id. at 2.
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courts will accept such a construction. Yet, the substantive and procedural rights outlined in Harper are likely to define the outer edges of
Federal Constitutional rights in the forcible medication area. Thus it
seems virtually assured that civilly committed patients will enjoy the
same substantive liberty interest as Harper. The Court suggested, in its
widely heralded dictum in the Rogers case, that a civilly committed patient had a Fourteenth Amendment right of refusal. 62 Harperconfirmed
that right and extended it to a prisoner. The controversial aspect of the
majority's ruling was its procedural holding, and the question left in its
wake is whether civilly committed patients will enjoy greater procedural
protections than the minimum process accorded to Harper. The Court,
first in Youngberg' 6 and again in Harper, emphatically and repeatedly
expressed its hostility toward judicial participation in medical decisionmaking, both in a civil commitment context and a prisoner context. Almost inevitably, the basic model of nonjudicial internal decisionmaking
endorsed by the Supreme Court in Harper will be applied in the civil
commitment context. This does not mean that courts will follow
Harper'sprocedures to the letter. The notice given to Harper prior to the
internal hearing (just twenty-four hours) would seem to be narrowly tailored to the punitive prison environment and inappropriate to the goals
of civil commitment. However, even though the details of procedural due
process may vary and expand in the civil area, the basic nonjudicial
model of forcible medication decisionmaking appears mandated by
Harperfor all mentally ill patients.
Likewise, the model of judicial deference to professional judgment is
likely to be applied to all mentally ill patients. The deference standard
was first articulated in a civil commitment context; the Court's repudiation of judicial participation in medical matters in Youngberg 1 and
Harper, strongly indicates that deference is a pervasive standard and
should be applied universally, whether the refuser is a prisoner or a
civilly committed patient.
CONCLUSION

Several years before the Supreme Court's decision in Harper, a
noted psychiatrist assessed the Court's Youngberg deference standard
and subsequent developments and made the following prediction:
162. Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 299 n.16 (1982).
163. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
164. Id.
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[l]t is very unlikely that resort to ftll judicial hearings to adjudicate the
patient's right to refuse will take place in many states. The ball has been
returned to psychiatry, departments 165
of mental health, and institutional personnel to assure the patient's rights.
In large measure, that prediction was correct. When the Supreme Court
announced its standard of deference to professional judgment in
Youngberg, judges, lawyers and psychiatrists were all put on notice that
the Court was opposed to judicial intervention in medical treatment decisions for patients in mental institutions.
The ruling in Harper sends a clear message that judges should not
become involved in treatment decisions regarding antipsychotic drugs,
except on appeal after medical professionals have made the decision to
medicate (and probably already implemented the decision). Even then,
judges are only to decide the narrow question of whether the decision
was made by a professional exercising appropriate judgment. Thus, judicial review is strictly limited to a negligence inquiry.
Such a standard does, indeed, return the ball to the psychiatric
court. However, that is not necessarily the end of the match. The commentator quoted above was not completely correct in predicting that
most state courts would follow the lead of the Supreme Court by leaving
the decision to forcibly medicate entirely to employees of state mental
institutions. It is true that many federal courts felt obligated, following
the Youngberg decision, to apply the deference standard to antipsychotic
drug refusal.16 6 Some state courts, however, applying state law, rejected
the deference standard and gave nondangerous patients judicial protection for a right to refuse.16 7 The New York Court of Appeals and the
Wisconsin Supreme Court, for example, supplanted the more deferential
decisions of federal courts in their states with strong judicial protections
for drug refusers, based in state law.168
The Harperdecision is not likely to stop these states or others from
carving out a more active judicial role in this controversial area. The
Supreme Court itself has long held that state law can recognize liberty
interests more extensive than those protected by the Federal Constitution
165. Roth, supra note 61, at 157.
166. See cases cited supra note 113.
167. See Rivers v. Katz, 495 N.E.2d 337 (N.Y. 1986) (where the New York Court of Appeals
supplanted the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Project Release v. Prevost, 722 F.2d 960
(2nd Cir. 1983)). See also State ex rel Jones v. Gerhardstein, 416 N.W.2d 883 (Wis. 1987) (supplanting the decision of the federal district court in Stensvad v. Reivitz, 601 F. Supp. 128 (W.D. Wis.

1985)).
168.

See cases cited supra note 167.
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and can confer procedural protections that extend beyond those minimally required by the Federal Constitution.1 69 This is precisely the situation here. The Supreme Court has clearly indicated an unwillingness to
extend more than minimum due process to patients who refuse antipsychotic medication. The Court has left it to the states to apply state
law in giving patients more due process. The Harper decision shouts
what Youngberg whispered: that states shall henceforth be the arena for
any further significant developments that may occur in this area of the
law, and state law is to be the vehicle for any extension of due process
beyond the meager dole given out by the Supreme Court in Harper.
Harper points claimants to the state court door and steers them
away from federal courts. That should not deter patients and their advocates. States as diverse as New York, Oklahoma, California, Colorado,
Massachusetts, and Wisconsin have seen fit to give incarcerated patients
significant due process protections in their courts. 170 State courts and
state legislatures elsewhere may be persuaded that mentally ill patients
should not be subjected to potentially harmful medications against their
will without significant protections against potential abuse. These states
may conclude, as their sister states have, that such legal protections offer
a humane and workable solution to a divisive problem.

169. See, e.g., Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 300 (1981) ("State law may recognize liberty interests more extensive than those independently protected by the Federal Constitution.") (citing Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U.S. 1, 7, 12 (1979)).
170. See cases cited and discussion supra note 45.

